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THE IMPACT OF LATIN AMERICAN ARMS 
PRODUCTION ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
By Robert E. Looney and Peter C. Frederiksen 
There has been a growing interest over the past several years 
on the effect defense spending has on economic performance in 
developing countries. Chan ( 1) has recently summarized the 
literature and the three main directions of the current research: 
the tradeoffs between military spending and other forms of 
government spending, the role of politics in decisions about 
defense expenditures, and whether defense is the cause or the 
effect of high unemployment and low growth in many coun-
tries. Chan chose to restrict his survey to studies which ex-
amine the latter: how do .defense expenditures affect economic 
performance, if at all. In his review of the literature, Chan 
notes that: 
Although numerous studies have suggested that defense 
spending can and does have an impact on economic per-
formance, there is no consensus about the actual existence 
and nature~ of such an impact. Some scholars have also 
questioned the suitability of common statistical method-
logy, and the feasibility of obtaining valid and robust 
generalizations for a large number of countries or time 
points. (2) 
Chan noted several other problems with past research. In his 
opinion, many studies have been based on very small samples, 
and yet in other cases the results have been biased either by 
including "outliers" in the sample or by the ideological assump-
tions of the researcher. The problem of determining the direc-
tion causality is common to all studies: does defense cause 
economic growth or does the growth of the economy "allow" 
countries to indulge in defense spending? Chan summarizes the 
state of the literature by noting that the theoretical impact of 
defense spending is usually agreed on.(3) The debate centers 
" ... around when, how, for whom, and in what direction and 
magnitude is likely to be actually felt ..... " ( 4) In other words 
he proposes that in the future research is iargeted in the follow-
ing directions: (5) 
1. What kind of impact does defense spending make; 
when does it take place - direction, magnitude, timing 
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(short versus long-term), and statistical significance of the 
estimated coefficients? 
2. How does this impact occur - first order (immediate 
direct impact) and second order (indirect effects on invest-
ment and savings)? 
3. The impact of what - precisely what is meant by 
defense spending (percent of GNP or budget, types of 
defense spending) or economic growth (growth of GNP, 
income distribution welfare)? 
4. Impact for which countries - is the relationship 
consistent with time for different countries with different 
economic conditions, or exposure to the international 
system?(5) 
5. Impact at what opportunity costs - what would the 
economy be like if no defense spending had taken place? 
Chan concludes by suggesting that the search for a universal 
relationship will be disappointing and by offering some alter-
native avenues for future research: · 
An alternative and perhaps more fruitful approach 
would be to eschew claims of generality at the present, 
while recognizing the complexity of the problem. This 
complexity suggests the need to account explicitly for 
factors that can mediate the influence of defense spending 
on economic performance, the need to trace the reciprocal 
over-time interactions among the pertinent variables, and 
the need to show the economic consequences of alter-
native combinations of policies to spend on defense 
and to offset the potentially adverse effects of this spend-
ing. (7) 
The purpose of this paper is to extend the discussion on the 
defense spending by testing for any statistical difference in 
the relationship between defense spending and economic per-
formance in Latin American countries which produce weapons 
and Latin American countries which do not produce weapons. 
We hypothesize that the relationship should be positive and 
statistically significant for the producing countries and negative 
for the non-producing countries. 
Since a major area of public enterprise in developing coun-
tries - and especially Latin America - is the defense industry, 
we argue that arms-producing natiqns are much more likely to 
derive positive economic benefits from military expenditures 
than their non-producing counterparts. This is likely to be true 
ARMS PRODUCTION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 311 
for at least two reasons. First, a major benefit of arms produc-
tion is that expenditures in the arms industry could be used 
quickly as a macroeconomic stabilization tool. The immediate 
impact of a change of on arms production is so rapid as to 
serve as a means of countercyclical fiscal policy. Obviously 
using this part of the defense budget is not an option for non-
producing countries. Secondly, it is hypothesized that produc-
tion spin-offs and linkages from defense production to other 
sectors of the economy would result in total military expendi-
tures having much more of a positive (or less of a negative) 
effect on overall growth in producer countries. In other words, 
weapons production expenditures will have a much more direct 
positive and lasting effect on the economy than a similar 
amount spent on operations, maintenance, or training for 
example. 
The first, section of this paper reviews the extent of and 
motives for arms production in developing countries with par-
ticular emphasis on Latin America. In the following section, the 
countries of Latin America are split into two groups (producers 
and non-producers) and regression equations are estimated to 
test the hupothesis that a postive relationship will be found 
between defense and growth in producing countries and a 
negative relationship in non-producing countries. 
The Extent of and Motives for Arms Production 
While the factors which determine whether a country be-
comes a producer or not are varied, the number of producers 
has grown in the last 30 years. For example, the number of 
developing countries producing at least one major weapon 
system has increased from 5 in 1950 to 26 in 1980. Neuman(8) 
has investigated the major socioeconomic reasons for domestic 
arms production. As a first step, she calculated a weighted 
average index of military production capability for the 26 coun-
tries producing arms in 1980. The index was based on three 
factors: length of production, experience, production capabil-
ity, and technical capability. Countries were rank ordered by 
this weighted index and Kendall's tau rank correlations were 
calculated between the index and seven socioeconomic indica-
tors (population, land size, size of military, Gross National 
Product (GNP), GNP per capita, num~er of professional and 
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tion, correlation coefficients were computed for all countries 
in the sample by different regions of the world. Neuman con-
cludes: 
The hypothesis that factors of scale might determine 
both the extent and level of arms prodµction is well sup-
ported. Generally, for each region countries with the 
largest populations, producing the highest GNP, and 
sustaining the largest military forces are also the largest 
and most sophisticated producers of weapons. (9) 
The existence of a large military to provide an adequate 
market, combined with a generous national income and a 
sizable population to support the necessary industrial 
infrastructure, significantly affects a state's long-term 
ability to produce major weapon systems as well as the 
quantity and sophistication of its product. ( 10) 
As noted above, defense industries comprise a substantial 
part of public sector enterprises in Latin American and the 
Caribbean. For example, Argentina's military industrial com-
plex "Fabricaciones Militares"(ll) is the largest firm in Latin 
America and one of the largest in the hemisphere. Brazil ranks 
as seventh among the world arms producers and exporters. As 
of 1980, nine of the twenty-one Latin American and Caribbean 
countries pro_duced one major weapon system (Table 1) and in 
each case the companies are either government owned or are 
joint private-government companies. There is a growing concern 
in the region about the impact of these industries on budgets, 
foreign exchange, the overall performance of the economy, and 
stabilization of the economy.(12) Yet there is scant evidence of 
the specific economic role and impact of these companies. 
Clearly the macroeconomic linkage with defense expenditures 
in general and defense production in particular should provide 
valuable insights into the defense spending and economic per-
formance debate. 
Neuman did not explicitly consider the role of economic or 
financial variables in determining whether a country becomes a 
producer or not. As Tehral pointed out for lndia(13) the 
financial burden associated with arms production is consider-
able; we. believe this is true for Latin America also. Many of 
these countries rely heavily on financial assistance, the spread 
of technology, and other forms of inter-country cooperation. 
Furthermore as Peleg has noted,(14) the capital entry require-
ments are large. As Ayres has also suggested, the characteristics 
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which separate producers from non-producers might be linked 
to the stages of "typical" country goes through on its transition 
to a producing nation.(15) These stages might include a) the 
importation of arms with domestic maintenance, b) license pro-
curement and establishment of production bases, c) the local 
assembly of imported subassemblies, d) subassemblies and 
components made domestically, e) raw materials produced 
locally and f) complete indigenous production. Obviously, the 
new producers in developed countries and so access to foreign 
exchange becomes important for initial success. 
In an earlier paper, we tested for the importance of economic 
variables in determining which countries become producers.(16) 
A discriminant analysis was used to see which variables best 
profile Latin American countries into producers and non-
producers. As we noted: 
In general, the producers are more highly developed in 
terms of per capita income, and (as Neuman predicts) their 
income, population and area are larger. The producers 
have a much larger public external debt, although the 
debt as a percent of GNP is considerably higher for the 
non-producers. The producers were also able to sustain 
a much higher level of imports and exports over the 
period than were the non-producers.(17) 
The results of the discriminant analysis based on size and mili-
tary variables were somewhat mixed. While the non-producers 
were all correctly classified, Ec'uador, Columbia, The Dominican 
Republic and Argentina were incorrectly classified as non-
producers. The average probability of correct placement was 
approximately 85% for the producers and just over 90% for the 
non-producers. Using economic variables as discriminators sub-
stantially improved the results in terms of correct classification 
and average probabilities of correct classification. The results 
suggested access to foreign exchange is just as important as 
population or military expenditures in determining which 
countries eventually become producers. The following section 
examines whether the relationship between defense spending 
and economic growth is statistically different between the pro-
ducing and non-producing countries. 
Regression Estimates 
Based solely on cost and comparative advantage, indige-
nous arms production seems suspect. While actual data on 
CHART ONE 
Producers 
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the cost of domestically produced weapons are not availa-
ble, it appears reasonable to assume that it is cheaper to 
import than produce a similar weapon at home.(18) How-
ever, domestic production may be justified on other 
grounds. For example, linkage between the defense and 
civilian sectors in a developing country may warrant use of 
skilled personnel and scarce foreign exchange being used in 
defense production. As noted above, military expenditures 
may provide the government with a powerful stabilization 
tool. ( 19) For example the arms industry and the civilian 
economy are closely interrelated. The government can 
contract with other state enterprises for production of 
parts and the salaries of both the military and civilians in 
the industry are likely to be spent in local markets. Since 
militaFy expenditures are often inflationary, reductions in 
the defense budget can act as a powerful anti-inflationary 
tool. Importantly, the military sector is under direct 
government control. A policy of economic expansion can 
be reached much more quickly through changes in new 
weapons contracts and production than say marginal tax 
changes for example. 
Once this self-regulating mechanism is in place many people 
(such as senior military officers and the owners/managers of 
subcontracting firms) find it to their advantage to maintain the 
status quo. Together these groups wield significant power. (20) 
These propositions suggest a· strong commitment to defense 
production purely on economic reasons and might explain the 
long term stability of defense spending in many Latin American 
countries. 
An ideal test for the impact of defense production of the 
domestic economies in Latin America would require data on 
military output and value added in defense production sector. 
Unfortunately, such data are not published. As Chan's article 
indicated, the contribution of total defense spending to eco-
nomic growth has been the object of close scrutiny recently. 
Along the lines of Benoit,(21} and our earlier papers,(22) we 
test for the role of defense expenditures in producer and non-
producer countries by estimating a production function in the 
following form: 
GNPGN = f (INVGR, FINAN, MILEXP), 
where GNPGR and INVGR represent the 1970-1982 growth in 
GNP and investment, respectively, FINAN is a financing vari-
ARMS PRODUCTION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 317 
able, and MILEXP is the 1981 ratio of military expenditures to 
GNP. The financing variables used in the regression estimates 
were PDA and PDB, the external public debt in 1970 and 1982, 
respectively, and GDB, the 1982 central government fiscal 
surplus or deficit as a percent of Gross Domestic Product. (23) 
The estimated regression equation for all Latin American coun-
ties was as follows: (24) 
GNPGR = 0.72 INVGR + 0.3 PDB - 0.25 MILEXP; r2 = .72 dof= 19 
(5.3)** (2.3)** (-1.5) 
As can be seen, the estimated coefficient for MILEXP while 
negative is statistically insignificant at the 90 percent level. To 
test the hypothesis that externalities and linkages from defense 
production industries should result in total military expendi-
tures having a positive effect on growth, the production func-
tion was estimated separately for the producing and non-
producing countries. The results are seen in Chart One. Most 
importantly, the estimated coefficient for MILEXP is positive 
and statistically significant for the producers and negative and 
statistically significant for the non-producers. This tentatively 
confirms the hypothesis that in non-producer countries defense 
expenditures (for items such as imported equipment, opera-
tions and maintenance) represents very significant opportunity 
costs and are a drain on economic growth. It appears that in 
the producing countries, where a large part of total military 
expenditures is for. production, growth is enhanced through 
externalities and stabilization as ,military spending expands 
and contracts. In all equations and coefficient of the invest-
ment variable is positive. For the financing variable, the results 
suggest that producing nations obtain higher rates of growth 
through fiscal policy: the lower the government deficit the 
higher the overall rate of growth'. External public debt did not 
play an important role in growth for these countries. On the 
other hand, for the non-producers there was no correlation 
between fiscal surpluses and deficits and growth. During the 
period examined, it appears that these countries relied on exter-
nal public sector borrowing to accelerate economic growth. 
These results support our earlier work in grouping producers 
and non-producers by economic and financial variables. (25) 
Producing· nations have a relatively lower foreign exchange 
constraint and are relatively more constrained by domestic 
resources. (26) The producers, while large absolute external 
borrowers, relied less on external funds than the non-producers. 
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Marginal additions of foreign funds for the producers are not as 
necessary to promote economic growth as domestic savings in 
the form of government surpluses. The non-producing nations 
face the opposite situation - relatively foreign-exchange con-
strained with marginal additions having a much greater impact 
on growth. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper has been to investigate whether or 
not the effect of defense expenditures on economic growth is 
different in Latin American countries which produce major 
weapon and those which do not. An earlier work suggested 
economic variables as being important determinant whether a 
country produces arms or not. In this paper, the results indicate 
that the impact of military expenditures tends to be posibitely 
associated with economic growth in the producing nations and 
negatively associated with growth in the non-producing nations 
of the region. The results also indicate that producing countries 
tend to use fiscal policy (e.g. reductions in the deficit) to 
achieve higher rates of growth. On the other hand, the non-
producers financed increaed growth through external public 
borrowing. 
This evidence suggests that producing countries may be able 
to obt'ain positive benefits from military spending through 
some form of linkage from their state enterprise to overall 
fiscal policy. Apparently, the, type of defense spending in non-
producing countries does not generate any measureable spin-
offs either to the economy in general or as part of overall 
stabilization efforts. 
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